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0f recent, the United States Supreme
Court has devoted a significant effort to
the analysls of defendants' rights in
interrogatlon settings. Through such
cases as llalng v. lloulton ( 38 CrL 3037 )
and lloran v. Burbine (38 CrL 3182), the
court has pursued, respectively, bothSirth Amendnent and Fifth Anendnent in-quirlea lnto the meaning of the right to
counsel and its effect on a law enforce-
ment offlcer's ability to queatlon a
auspect in custody.
fn the lfoulton case the court condemnedpollce acTf6i-Jn recording an indicted
defendant's discussion, with his codefen-
dant-turned-infornant, of the crlme for
which he had been lndicted without his
opportunity to consult with counsel first.
fn the Burbine case the court upheldthe refusal of police interrogatlng a
nurder suspect to inform hirn that a law-yer retalned on his behalf was attempting
to reach hln.
The dlfficulty raised in the law
enforcenent conmunity by such decisions
ss lfoulton and Burbine is not so nuch
"what" those decisions stand for as
"whlch" rlght to counsel, Fifth Anendment
or Slrth Anendnent, BD offlcer may be
deallng wlth in a given contert.
Since the decision in lllranda v.
Arizona (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), the Fifth
Anendnent right to counsel, gpamed by
the court's interpretation of that Arnend-
rnent, has been relatively well understoodby the officer on the street. For what-
ever else it nay nean, virtually every
officer undergtands that a suspect's
request for a lawyer brings any interro-gation, oF could-be interrogation, to a
screaning halt unless either the suspect
or the suspect's larryer iniLiates further
conversation. This rule, set forth in
Edrards v. Arizona (451 U.S. 417 (1981)),
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chether undergt,ood by nane or by prlnci-plo, ls ono which creates no apparentproblen ln appllcation.
The right to coungel envlsioned by theSlxth Anendnent, however, ie a horse of adlfferent color. llany offlcers have a
vatue notlon that a suspect who ls repre-gented by a lanyer nust be dealt with
through the larryer but the precise polntin tlme at whlch this vlcarious negotia-tion must occur, renains, in large part,
a nyatery.
fn l{lchlran v. Jackson (39 CrL 3OO1)Oplnlon llo. 84-1531 and ttichlsan v.
Bladel (39 CrL 3001) Opinion trlo. 84-1539,both decided April 1, 1986, the SupremeCourt conpounded the already nebulousdistinction whlch exists betneen the
rlght to counsel protected by the Fifth
and Sirth Anendnents.
fhe facts in both cases are substan-tlally slnller and require only brlef
recltatlon. Defendant Bladel nag
arrested end arraigned on murder charges
arislng out of the killing of three rail-
road enployees. At the arraignnent,Bladel, ln the presence of the police,
requested appolntment of counsel because
of hls lnabllity to afford counsel. A
notlce of appolntnent was mailed to a lawflnn, but prlor to the firn's receipt of
the notice, Bladel was interviened by thepolice end confessed to the nurders.
Defendant Jackson requested appointnrent
of counsel at his arraignnent on murder
and consplracy charges. Prior to ar-
ralgnnent he had rnade inculpatory state-
nentg to the police. llonetheless, after
the arraignnent, at which police had beenpresent, and prlor to his opportunlty to
congult with counsel, Jackson was ques-tioned concerning the charges to
"confirm" that he was the proper suspect.fn both cases the defendants sere givenproper ltiranda advisenents prior to ques-tionlng and waived the presence of
counael. fn both cases the defendants
were convicted based, ln significantpart, on their post-arraignrnent state_
ments. fn both cases the defendants
argued that thelr right to counsel hadbeen violated by state-initiated ques-tioning after the requesL for counsel atEhe arraignment and that there was no
valid waiver for Sirth Amendment purposes.
The court'g analysi s of the defense
argument begins with its eranlnatlon ofthe Sirth Anrendment, right to counselitself. The court notes that the Sirth
Amendnent rlght to counsel guarantees an
accused "... the right to rely on counsel
as a 'medium' between him and the Stat,e.,,(Tert at 3003 citing llaine v. iloulton,
47 4 U. S . at 
_) and further ttrat tnls
right to counsel envisloned by the SirthAnendnent is not limlted merely lo
"representatlon in fornal legal proceed-ings (Tert at 3003). The court,s enswer,however, to lhe quesLion of when t,he
right attaches ls replete with confuslon.lJhile the facts of Bladel and Jackson are
such that an actual-Te[iest i6Flou-nseldid occur, the language in the SupremeCourt'g opinion goes on to say that ',...
we presume that the defendant requeststhe lawyer's services at every crltical
stage of the prosecution. " (Iert at3003), but then notes, in a footnote tothe opinion that ". . . we do not, of
course, suggest that the right to counselturns on guch a request (r)ather we
construe the defendant,s request for
counsel as an ertremely important fact in
considerlng the validity of a subsequent
waiver in response to police-initlatedinterrogation." (TexL at 3003, footnote6.) fhe issue of when a defendant has
"requested" counsel thus becomes hazy,
Following the pronouncement that theSirth Anendment right to counsel a[taches
upon the defendant's "request,, the court
then states that the rule of Edwards v.
Arizona (cite supra) wilt appryT--Efiffi'
Anendnent as well as Fifth Amendnent
counsel reguests.
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Effectively thig ruling will do littteto clarlfy the disLinctions heretofore
eristing between the Fifth and Slxth
Amendments' asSurance of counsel. Rather,lac enforcement offlcers will be placedin the unenvlable position of decipherlng
whether an arralgned defendant, who hag
not asked for counsel, hag nonetheless
"requested" counsel so as to bar pollceinterrogation. Justice Rehnquist's dis-
sent indeed pogits that ". . . the Court
most asauredly does not hold that the
Edwardg por se rule, prohibltlng allpollce-inltlated interrogations, appllesfron the moment the defendent's Sirth
Amendnent rlght to counsel attaches, with
or wlthout a request for counsel by the
defsndant." (Tert at 3005), and then goes
further to noLe that such an interpreta-
tton would render the tern "waiver" obgo-lete ln Slxth Anendment counsel situa-
tlong.
Following the logic of the maJority, a
defendant may be said to have "requested"
counsel ". . . after a formal accusationhas been made and a person rrho hadprevlously been just a 'suspect' has
become an 'sccused. "' (Tert at 3003)
Traditionally this stage may be said to
occur at lndictnent. Once the ',request,,for counsel occurs, there can be nopolice-initiated interrogation of thedefendant, even if the pollce should
obtain a walver of rights from the defen-dant. Additionally, even should thepolice not be present when the requestfor counsel is verbally made by a defen-dant, the knowledge of that request willbe imputed fron "one state actor to
another." (Tert at 3003)
Pending clariflcatlon of what a
"reguest" for counsel must entail, offi-
cers are now placed in somewhat of aquandry. tJhile, BS Justice Rehnquistpoints out in his dissent, a suspect rho
has merely reached the point at which theSirth Amendment right to counsel applies
should not be presumed to have requested
counsel so as to invoke the Edwards rule,lhe naJority's opinion Ueg;-atarif ica-tion. Until this issue is resolved,
officers are best advised not to initiatequesLioning of a suspect who has beenindicted, whether a formal request has
been nade for counsel or not.
tEGAt L}G aa published mon'tl*-q bq 4e South Cano!.Lno, Cn inLnot JuLLee Aeod,enq,J-2\n,1. 
,g'L,ryq,, ExeatLLve Dinectoz. The Aca/'enU'd^ .Lega.(- a((ai:u and, l-ega.{. ii}"ruilio"oae hand.[-ed btl Janu.l'!. K.i.zbg, betion bta.66 courue,L, Hennq i<aq wengnow, genena.t ciiuel,
Wi.L(iam C. Smi.th and John H. Wh"i.L1-e,ton, Sn., M.o.{g couw.el. -
